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Abstract 
 
The paper examines the conditions under which technological successions can occur in the presence of 
network externalities.  A two-stage, multi-agent simulation model is presented in which product 
designs co-evolve with consumer preferences.  It provides a rich framework in which to study the 
complex phenomenon of quality.  Following an initial period, in which old technology firms develop 
their designs and externalities accrue, a technological shock occurs.  New technology firms and new 
consumer classes enter the market.  Data from the simulation model is analysed by identifying a robust 
econometric model of the probability of succession, given the immediate state of the post-shock 
market.  4 factors affecting the probability of a succession are identified.  First, succession can occur if 
gains in direct utility from higher quality new technology goods outweigh the network utility of old 
technology goods.  Second, sailing ship effects are possible.  Old firms can innovate in order to see off 
the new entrants.  Hence, a better initial (new technology) design does not guarantee succession.  Third, 
a trade-off exists between quality and price.  A succession will not occur if cost (price) differentials 
favour the old technology.  Consequently, increasing returns in production enjoyed by established firms 
are an important barrier to successful entry.  The fourth factor is time: the relative length of time old 
firms have to develop their products, and that which new firms have to develop their products. 
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1. Introduction: technological successions and network externalities 
 
 
The paper investigates the conditions under which technological successions occur.  It 
draws together two areas of research that have, by and large, previously treated as 
separate: competition between sequential technologies and network externalities.  
Interest in sequential technology competitions dates back to Schumpeter’s proposition 
that new technologies are the fuel of long-run economic growth, and increasing 
welfare.  Long-run economic development, he argued, occurs when an economy 
moves from one base technology to another.  Empirical research by Grübler (1990, 
1991) and Nakićenović (1986, 1991) on the changing relative market shares of 
sequential technologies in primary energy, shipping, and urban transport over long 
historical periods, clearly indicate that new technologies do displace (however 
infrequently) established dominant technologies.  In order for this to occur, a new 
technology must overcome the network externalities enjoyed by an established (old) 
technology.   
 
 
Research on network externalities has tended to consider contemporaneous 
competitions between rival variants of the same technology (e.g. Arthur, 1989; Katz 
and Shapiro, 1986; Farrell and Saloner, 1985).  A notable exception is David’s 
empirical case study of the qwerty keyboard (David, 1985).  The dvorak keyboard, a 
later and more efficient typing layout, was unable to displace the established qwerty 
technology due to the network externalities enjoyed by the latter.  This has been 
challenged, theoretically and empirically by Liebowitz and Margolis (1990).  They 
make two distinct arguments.  First, they challenge the proposition that unsponsored 
competitions between rival variants of the same technology variants will result in the 
selection of an inferior variant.  Second, they challenge the proposition that 
established technologies can then subsequently lock-out (in the manner described by 
David) later, superior technologies.  
 
 
Arthur (1988), and David and Greenstein (1990) list a range of supply and demand 
side factors that may lock-out a new technology.  In addition to pecuniary and non-
pecuniary switching costs faced by users, scale economies in production, learning and 
competence creation costs of firms, and the marketing and advertising costs of 
establishing a market for a new technology may be significant.  For each of these 
factors, increasing marginal returns accompanies growing market size and share.  
Taking these factors into account, the paper will consider the conditions under which 
supply and demand side externalities may be overcome by a later technology.   
 
 
In order to proceed, we need to clarify the stage of technology development that we 
are considering here, and to distinguish between technological successions and 
technological substitutions.  Here we are considering the factors relevant to the 
diffusion of a new technology.  This is the third, and final, phase of technology 
development discussed by Schumpeter (1912, 1939).  The first phase, invention, is 
usually related to some empirical or scientific discovery.  In itself, an invention has no 
economic or social significance, and typically offers no hints about possible 
applications.  For various reasons, many discoveries are never applied in the 
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economic domain.  This may be due to problems in attracting risk capital, or else a 
lack of interest by entrepreneurs who may perceive the risks as too high or else see no 
clear market application.  Alternatively, the discovery may conflict with social or 
religious norms (e.g. the current debate on the genetic cloning).  Hence, demand is 
low and the venture is risky. 
 
 
The second phase, innovation, is the point at which the invention is actually applied 
for the first time, whether this be in the form of a product or a process (Mensch, 
1979).  Again, there are many reasons why a technology may not pass this particular 
stage, or else be retarded for a significant period of time.  A new technology may 
require changes in other, upstream and downstream technologies.  For example, the 
car required developments in materials (high quality steel sheets), in chemicals (oil 
refining), the development of a new way of organising production (Fordist mass 
manufacturing combined with Taylorist scientific management principles), and an 
extensive supporting infrastructure of roads, petrol stations, and repair facilities 
(Rosenberg, 1982; Grübler 1998).  If such changes had not occurred, then this 
technology would be retarded, or at best have had a localised and limited impact on 
mobility and productivity.   
 
 
The first applications of a technology are invariably crude and inefficient.  Not only is 
their performance usually poor compared to existing (alternative) technologies, but 
the (fixed) production costs are likely to be very high.  Hence, innovations are not 
automatically capable of diffusing.  They are rather like swan’s eggs, requiring a 
(possibly long) gestation period in which further basic research and development is 
needed to develop them1.  If this is not possible, then many will perish.  Rosenberg 
(1982) observes that survival of the new technology requires the establishment of a 
protected space in which further development can be achieved.  This can take the 
form of distinct niche or sub-niche in the market, which may be complementary to the 
established technology, or else take the form of public sector support, where users are 
often also contributors to the R&D process.  Examples of the former include railways, 
which did not initially compete with canals and water transport but were used as 
feeders to them, and steam ships, which (as tug boats) towed large sail ships into and 
out of port.  Examples of the latter include the internet, which was invented and 
subsequently developed by the U.S. military, and the world-wide-web, which was 
invented and developed by a network of European and US universities. 
 
 
In this paper we focus on the third phase of a new technology; its diffusion.  Diffusion 
involves the widespread assimilation of a technology within a socio-economic setting 
(Grübler, 1998).  Here we are specifically interested in the case where diffusion 
involves new technologies directly competing with, and successfully supplanting, 
existing practices and artefacts.  If the development of a technology at the innovation 
stage can be likened to a swan’s egg requiring further gestation, then it can be likened 
to an ugly duckling at the outset of this diffusion stage.  The protection afforded by its 
niche has enabled the technology to be further developed and improved.  However, if 
                                                           
1 Mokyr (1990) has, rather less poetically, labelled technologies at this stage as ‘hopeful monstrosities’.  
‘Hopeful’ because they have particular features that are of interest, and ‘monstrous’ because of their 
initial crudeness and inefficiency. 
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it is to continue developing into a swan, then it must directly compete with the 
dominant technology for resources. 
 
 
Having clarified the phase of technological development under consideration, we next 
need to clarify the distinction between a technological substitution and a technological 
succession (the focus of our paper).  In a technological substitution, a new technology 
is used in the same way as the old technology.  It is adopted because it offers a 
superior quality/price performance in the same basic use.  In terms of Lancaster’s 
characteristics approach (Lancaster, 1971), the new technology has a superior 
performance in one or more service characteristics that are common to both it and the 
old technology.  For example, the compact disk (CD) replaced the vinyl LP in 
domestic music systems in the 1980s.  Consumers adopted the CD as a storage 
medium for music because it is more convenient (i.e. is smaller in size), requires less 
maintenance (no need to clean disks regularly), individual tracks can be accurately 
and easily selected (using a remote control unit), and is far less prone to degradation 
(i.e. scratches) than vinyl.  Hardware manufacturers saw an opportunity to increase 
profits through sales of new CD players, while record companies realised that 
significant profits could be generated if, in addition to new material, consumers could 
be convinced to repurchase previously owned material, this time in the CD format.  
 
 
In contrast to a technological substitution, a technological succession opens up new 
consumption possibilities.  In terms of Lancaster’s characteristics approach, the new 
technology offers one or more new service characteristics that were previously 
unavailable using the old technology.  These may not necessarily have been evident in 
the invention or innovation stages, but become apparent in the diffusion stage as 
producers and consumers continue to experiment with the new technology, possibly 
combining it in novel ways with other technologies that appear in this phase.  For 
example, the car initially competed with alternative forms of urban transport 
(predominantly horse-drawn vehicles such as trams)2.  By the 1930s it had become the 
dominant form of urban travel in the USA, while in Western Europe the transition 
occurred shortly after WWII.  Subsequently, new markets emerged as a consequence 
of wider social, economic and political changes after the war.  Notable amongst these 
were the rise of suburban living, and long-distance recreational and business travel.  
The public health movement, which had begun in the late 19th century as a reaction to 
the pollution and disease of overcrowded cities, gave rise to the concept of suburban 
living as the morally and physically healthy alternative to the city (McShane, 1994).  
The development of suburban living after WWII saw the emergence of new type of 
commuter, the suburban car commuter.   
 
 
Individual mobility was further heightened by the development of motorway systems 
after WWII.  These brought the car into competition with railways for the first time.  
In addition to a rapid expansion in the number of road haulage companies operating 
nationally and internationally, another type of car-owning consumer class was born, 
the ‘business rep’.  This class has remained the staple purchaser of new car sales ever 
since.  The post-war economic boom, which lasted from the 1950s to the 1970s, 
                                                           
2 For detailed historical studies of the rise of the car see Flink (1990), Kirsch (2000), McShane (1994), 
and Mom and Kirsch (2001). 
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brought higher wages and leisure time to both the middle and working classes.  The 
car became an important symbol of the emergent ‘consumer culture’, and motorways 
facilitated the boom in leisure travel.  As the car example illustrates, a technological 
succession is associated with the emergence of new consumer classes with new 
preference sets.  This contrasts sharply with technological substitutions, where users 
adopt a new technology because it better fulfils the same role, increasing consumer 
utility over an unchanging set of preferences.   
 
 
Having clarified the focus of the current study, and having identified the supply and 
demand side factors that generate positive externalities for a dominant technology, we 
proceed, in section 2, to consider the conditions under which a technological 
succession can occur.  Of particular importance is the identification of factors, 
associated with a new technology, which either offset or outweigh the network 
externalities associated with the old technology.  Here we take into account the 
insights of previous papers on the subject.  There are surprisingly few in number, two 
notable exceptions being Shy (1996), and Malerba et al. (1999).  We also take into 
account the historical literature on technological displacements, particularly in land 
transport.  This is for two reasons.  First, sequential technological competitions in land 
transport in the US and Europe have been thoroughly researched by historians and 
economists.  Second, it is an area of ongoing interest for economists, and 
understanding the dynamics of past successions may assist in debates regarding the 
development of more environmentally friendly and less congested urban transport.  
 
 
Section 3 presents a model that incorporates the salient features of this discussion.  
Notably, it incorporates the increasing returns in production and demand side 
externalities enjoyed by dominant technologies, and the factors that can offset these 
effects, thereby enabling a technological succession to occur.  Important differences 
between this model and previous models lie in the treatment of product quality.  This 
is here modelled as a multi-dimensional space of service characteristics.  Another 
important difference is that technological diffusion is modelled as a co-evolutionary 
process in which both supply and demand conditions change over time as consumers 
and firms learn about the new possibilities associated with the production and 
consumption of the new technology.  Given the large number of parameters involved, 
and the desire to examine these in a meaningful manner, section 4 reports the findings 
of a large number of simulation runs conducted on the model.  On the basis of these 
simulations we generate an econometric model for the prediction of succession. The 
results of this econometric modelling are detailed in section 5, with a review and 
summary of the implications of the findings in section 6. 
 
 
 
2. Conditions for a technological succession 
 
 
In this section we identify a set of potential conditions for a technological succession.  
An important starting point for the current discussion is Shy’s 1996 paper on consumer 
substitution of quality and network externalities in sequential technology competitions.  
Shy develops a successive generations model in which there are repeated technology 
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adoptions.  Preferences between an ‘old’ consumer generation and a ‘young’ consumer 
generation can differ in the model (although preferences within each generation are 
assumed to be identical).  It is assumed that the new technology offers an additional 
characteristic not provided by the old technology, but that the two technologies are 
otherwise identical.  In this way, the new technology is de facto assumed to be of higher 
quality.  Further, it is assumed that the prices charged for the two technologies are the 
same.  Shy finds that a technological succession can occur provided the new consumer 
generation treats quality and network externalities as substitutes.  If, however, quality 
and network externalities are treated as complements, then the old technology will be 
selected.  Shy identifies a number of necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for a 
technological succession.  First, both a new consumer class (with a new preference set) 
and one or more firms producing the new technology must be present3.  Logically, a 
succession cannot occur if only one or other is present.  Second, the members of the new 
consumer class must positively value the additional characteristic(s) offered by the new 
technology.  Third, the new technology must be competitive in those characteristics that 
are common to both technologies. 
 
 
The Malerba et al. (1999) multi-agent model also emphasises the need for both a new 
consumer class (with a new preference set) and the presence of new technology 
producers.  Their analysis is more sophisticated in its treatment of new and old 
consumer classes.  Both old and new consumer classes are present, with the outcome of 
competition depending on how well these alternative classes are serviced by old and new 
technology firms.  The analysis is conducted within a two-dimensional quality/price 
space.  This can be divided into a number of compartments, each representing a 
different technology.  The authors structure and order the quality/price space in a very 
specific manner.  Namely, it is dividing it into two distinct compartments, one 
containing all the old technology designs, the other all the new technology designs.  In 
this set-up, old technology designs are located in a compartment that is lower in 
quality and higher in price than new technology designs.  Initially, only the old 
technology space is explored.  Later, after a predetermined point in time, the new 
technology space is explored by firms and consumers.  The set-up is such that, once 
firms and consumers search this new space a succession must occur de facto. 
 
 
A technology space can be populated by a number of distinct niches, or ‘sub-markets’.   
A niche is defined as containing one consumer group or ‘class’.  Since each class has 
a distinct preference set (here a particular point in quality/price space), the number of 
potential market niches is determined by the number of consumer classes that are 
initialised by the modeller.  The utility functions of the classes are randomised within 
the overall quality/price parameters of each compartment (i.e. old and new 
technology), and remain fixed thereafter.  Because user preferences are initialised as 
fixed points in quality/price space, a particular class will not become ‘active’ until a 
minimum level of quality/price performance has been reached.  Once this threshold 
has been reached, the value that a consumer class places on a technology design 
becomes an increasing function of its performance and its cheapness.  The utility of a 
design for a particular class is given by a Cobb-Douglas function in which the 
exponents are measures of the extent to the quality and price threshold requirements 
                                                           
3 Also see Rosenberg (1982) and Rogers (2003) on this point.  
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have been exceeded.  Consumer utility also depends on the number of other users 
currently using the design (measured by current market share) and advertising.  
Together, these can generate strong lock-in effects.   
 
 
Firms’ profits are gross margins on production costs.  Using these funds, firms can 
innovate and explore the quality/price space.  Through innovation, the first set of 
firms search the pre-specified old technology quality/price space, and succeed or fail 
in developing designs that satisfy a consumer class.  Later, at a given time in a 
simulation run, a new group of firms are created and the design space is opened up to 
include the new technology market.  A new set of firms/designs is randomly 
distributed across a (pre-specified) new quality/price space.  This new technology 
space differs to the quality/price space of the old technology by at least one 
characteristic, i.e. the characteristics are different in at least one dimension.  The 
survival of the new technology firms also depends on the identification of a design 
that satisfies the price/quality preference of a consumer class.  If the initial 
endowment of a firm is exhausted before its design meets a consumer class’ minimum 
quality-price threshold, it will become bankrupt.  Note that in this model old 
technology firms can survive by setting up a spin-off company to produce the new 
technology product.   
 
 
As in the Shy model, a succession will only occur if welfare improvements due to the 
higher quality offers of the new technology outweigh the externality effects associated 
with the old technology.  In addition, Malerba et al. handle user heterogeneity in a more 
sophisticated manner.  A succession not only involves the emergence of new firms 
producing rival technological artefacts, but also the emergence of one or more consumer 
classes, with distinct preference sets, that rival the old consumer classes.  Hence, a 
succession sees the displacement of an established production-consumption nexus by a 
new production-consumption nexus.  Together with the discussion of niche and 
consumer class, this greatly clarifies our understanding of technological successions.  
The probability of a succession occurring is likely to depend on differences between the 
utility enjoyed by consumers of the new technology and those enjoyed by consumers of 
the old technology.  This prompts the first of the research hypotheses to be tested in the 
model; 
 
Hypothesis 1: the probability of a succession occurring depends on there being a positive 
differential between the direct utility of consuming new technology goods and the direct 
utility of consuming the old technology goods. 
 
 
Unfortunately, a number of key issues are inadequately addressed in these models.  
First, there is the issue of quality differentiation between old and new technologies. 
Shy assumes that each technology is identical but for one service characteristic, which 
is only offered by the new technology.  Malerba et al., meanwhile, treat quality as a 
simple integer value, and assume that the new technology is always superior in 
quality/price performance.  Yet, a universal measure of product quality does not exist. 
Perceived quality depends on the particular set of consumer preferences that exist in 
the market at any given moment in time, and so is subjective, temporal, subject to 
change (as preferences change over time), and is external to the firm.  Second, 
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innovation is treated in a highly problematic manner in the Malerba et al. model, and 
is completely omitted in the Shy model.  Both aspects are likely to play a key role in 
determining whether or not a succession occurs.  We shall address these in detail in 
the remainder of this section.  Further, they will form an important part of the formal 
model presented in section 3. 
 
 
Quality is a complex phenomenon in its own right.  In part, perceived quality is 
related to the technical performance that gives rise to a set of service characteristics 
that are consumed by the user.  In part, perceived quality depends on the relative 
importance that users attach to the service characteristics that are offered (Lancaster, 
1971).  It is rare that a new technology is unambiguously superior to its rivals, even 
from a technical standpoint.  Indeed, historical studies of technological change indicate 
that later technologies tend to be better in some aspects of performance but weaker in 
others.  Further, while a new technology may offer one or more novel service 
characteristics, service characteristics provided by the old technology may be missing 
(Rosenberg, 1982; Grübler, 1990).  Hence, even from a technical standpoint, one 
cannot state ex ante that a new technology is unambiguously superior to an older 
technology.  Take, for example, the choice between the car and the bus.  Both fulfil 
the same function, to transport people from one geographical point to another.  The 
car has clear advantages over the bus in terms of the greater freedom it offers users in 
the timing and flexibility.  Not only can a car user choose when to begin a journey (at 
any time, day or night), but the user can decide which route they prefer to travel.  In 
addition, users derive certain benefits (e.g. status) from the fact that a car is a private 
consumption good.  However, the car is a relatively inefficient and more expensive 
means of moving large numbers of commuters in urban areas, particularly in peak 
traffic times.  Traffic congestion results in high levels of stress for the car driver.  
These are not endured if one uses the bus alternative. 
 
 
It is important to explicitly recognise, in any discussion of technological successions, 
the extent to which perceived quality also depends on users’ preferences.  Different 
consumer classes attach different valuations to the range of service characteristics 
provided by alternative technologies, reflecting differences in their lifestyles, 
interests, and values4.  For instance, a succession could occur if a new consumer group 
places a high value on a new service characteristic and is disinterested in the relatively 
inferior or missing service characteristics.  The inherent difficulty in trying to assess 
whether a new technology will diffuse is further complicated by the fact that the 
population of consumer classes changes over time.  Moreover, as the car example 
previously discussed illustrates so well, this can happen within a short space of time as 
the technology is diffusing.  In our model, the evolution of consumer groups is 
endogenised and made subject to evolutionary selection.  This is achieved through a 
replicator algorithm, which allocates differential rewards to the competing consumer 
classes.  Classes enjoying above-average levels of realised utility will grow in size 
over time.  By contrast, classes with below-average levels of realised utility decline in 
size.   
 
 
                                                           
4 See important contributions on the sociology of consumption by Simmel (1957), Bourdieu (1984), 
and Giddens (1991).   
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Using the model, we will analyse important aspects of price left unexplored in the Shy 
and Malerba et al. models.  Higher levels of service characteristics tend to be more 
expensive to produce and will be reflected in the different prices of rival designs.  
Given that consumer welfare depends on the relative performance of each technology 
(direct utility) and the price paid for each technology (indirect loss of utility), a trade-
off exists between quality and price, and this is likely to influence the probability of a 
succession occurring.  Given this, an important potential barrier to succession is the 
economies of scale enjoyed by established firms prior to new firms’ market entry.  
Over time, unit production costs tend to fall as a consequence of static and/or dynamic 
economies of scale.  As noted in section 1, Arthur (1988), and David and Greenstein 
(1990) have highlighted the importance of scale economies in determining the 
outcome of technological competitions.  An established technology may enjoy static 
(level of production) scale economies and/or dynamic economies of scale (due to 
learning by doing) garnered over time.  Both, of course, are initially unavailable to a 
new technology entrant.  This prompts a second research hypothesis; 
 
Hypothesis 2: economies of scale in production influences the probability of a succession 
occurring. 
 
 
From the foregoing discussion of quality and price it is clear that, while new 
technology designs may not be fully-fledged swans at the outset of the diffusion 
phase, they must, at the very least, be attractive ducklings.  In order to offset the 
demand side externalities and increasing returns in production enjoyed by the 
established technology, a new technology must offer a set of service characteristics 
that approximately meet the preferences of one or more new consumer classes.  
Otherwise, production levels will be insufficient for increasing returns in production, 
and revenues will be insufficient to fund further innovation.  Of course, old as well as 
new technology firms can innovate in order to improve quality/price performance.  
Payson’s (1994) study of a range of consumer products from Sears catalogues 
between 1928 and 1993 found significant improvements in product specifications, 
even in low technology goods such as sofas and shoes.  Average improvement was 
2% to 3% per year, with improvements in higher technology products ranging 
between 7% and 9% per year.  In addition, average prices fell throughout the period as 
markets continued to increase in size and average unit costs fell.   
 
 
Another important difference between our model and the Shy and Malerba et al. 
models is our consideration of the so-called ‘sail ship effect’.  Innovation by old 
technology firms may be stimulated by the arrival of new technology firms seeking to 
displace them5.  Indeed, it is possible that the innovative activity of established firms 
may result in improvements in performance sufficient to see off the challenge posed 
by new technology entrants.  This possibility is not considered in either the Shy or 
Malerba et al. model.  As previously noted, there is no innovation in the Shy model, 
while the possibility of such an effect is explicitly omitted in the Malerba et al. model 
because it assumes the maximum quality/price performance of the old technology is at 
best equal to the minimum quality/price performance of the new technology.  
However it is clear that the relative innovation performance of old and new technology 
                                                           
5 The term was first coined by Gilfillan (1935) when referring to the rapid spurt of technical 
improvement in sailing ships that followed the introduction of steamships in the in the 1860s. 
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firms in sequential technological competitions is likely to be a key factor determining 
whether or not a succession occurs.  This leads us to our third research hypothesis; 
 
Hypothesis 3: the relative post-shock innovation performance of old and new technology 
firms influences the probability of a succession occurring. 
 
 
A final factor we need to consider is time.  The probability of a succession occurring 
is likely to be influenced by two time issues.  First, the length of time old technology 
firms have to identify (through innovation) designs that meet the preferences of their 
target consumer classes, and to exploit increasing returns in production prior to the 
diffusion of the new technology.  Second, the length of time new technology firms 
have to develop their designs and exploit increasing returns in production before yet 
another technological shock.  Again, this issue is not addressed by Shy or Malerba et 
al.  Yet, one would expect that the probability of a succession occurring will be lower 
the longer is the first time period, and the shorter is the second period.  In this paper 
we test the following proposition; 
 
Hypothesis 4: the probability of a succession occurring is negatively related to the length 
of time old technology firms have to innovate and identify successful designs, and 
positively related to the length of time new technology firms have to innovate and 
identify successful designs. 
 
 
 
3.  A model of technological successions 
 
 
In this section we outline the simulation model that is used to investigate our four 
research questions.  The model develops and extends the Windrum and Birchenhall 
(1998) model to consider competitions between sequential technologies.  Most 
notable are the inclusion of user network externalities in consumer demand, the birth 
of new consumer classes and new technology firms, and the assignment of 
preferences to new consumers and of initial designs to new firms.  Numerous, more 
subtle changes have been made which are elucidated below. 
 
 
At the heart of the model is a market made up of a heterogeneous population of 
consumers that coevolve with a heterogeneous population of competing firms.  There 
are a given number of individual consumers (specified at the outset by the modeller) 
in each period.  These are distributed across a limited number of consumer groups or 
‘classes’.  Associated with each class is a utility function.  This embodies the 
particular criteria used by this class to select between the competing technology 
artefacts offered by firms.  Total utility is the sum of three components: direct utility, 
indirect utility and the network utility.  ‘Network utility’ is a function of the market 
share of the consumer’s adopted  technology design, in that the more units of the 
adopted good sold in the market, the greater the size of the network externality.   
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Following Lancaster (1971), ‘direct utility’ is the utility gained by consuming the set 
of service characteristics embodied in a good.  Lancaster observes that a commodity 
is not desired for itself (i.e. as an engineering solution to a particular problem) but 
because it provides service characteristics that yield direct utility when consumed.  
For example, the basic function of a car is to transport people and goods from one 
place to another.  Speed, fuel economy, comfort of ride, storage space, aesthetic 
design, and pride of ownership are the service characteristics.  Alternative car designs 
will offer slightly different trade-offs amongst these common characteristics (e.g. 
family cars are less fast but provide better fuel economy and storage space than sports 
cars).  Firms offering different variants of the same generic technology are competing 
by offering consumers different levels of service within a common set of service 
characteristics.  By contrast, alternative technologies differ with respect to the set of 
service characteristics offered.  For example, users of a bus service derive no pride 
from ownership (it is owned by a third party).  On the other hand, they are able to 
hand over driving stress to the bus driver.  Hence, new and old technology firms offer 
consumers different sets of service characteristics.  In our model, a key feature of the 
technological shock is the extended set of characteristics made available by the new 
technology firms.  
 
 
‘Indirect utility’ is the utility the consumer obtains from spending residual income – 
income minus price of good bought in the modelled market – on other goods. The 
higher the price of a good, the less money the consumer can spend in other markets 
and the lower is indirect utility.  Note that a consumer may decide not to purchase any 
of the technology goods/services currently offered but instead use the money to 
purchase goods in other markets.  In other words, expenditure in the modelled market 
has an opportunity cost.  The utility obtained from making zero purchases in the 
modelled market (i.e. spending all disposable income in other markets) is the null 
utility.  Together, direct utility and indirect utility make up the total ‘intrinsic utility’ 
gained through consumption.  Intrinsic utility (relative to null utility) measures the net 
gain from purchasing the good.  If the consumer does not purchase any of the 
competing goods in this market, then realised intrinsic utility is equal to the null 
utility.   
 
 
Formally the utility function of each consumer class is modelled as  
 
U(x,p,s) = d(x) + V(m – p) + e(s(x)) (1) 
 
where d(x) is the direct utility provided by the design vector x, V(m – p) is the indirect 
utility having purchased the good (m is initial income of the consumer and p is the 
price of the good), and e(s(x)) is the network utility. Here s(x) is the current market 
share of design x.  We assume linearly increasing network externalities with e(s) = γs, 
γ being a positive constant.    
 
 
In Shy’s model, succession depends on how consumers treat network utility and 
intrinsic utility.  This is also the case in our model.  Whether or not a succession 
occurs depends on a number of other factors.  First, it depends on how consumers 
treat the two components that make up intrinsic utility: direct utility d(x) and indirect 
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utility V(m – p).  Within direct utility there may be a trade-off between the novel 
characteristics that are only offered by the new technology, and superior service 
characteristics offered by the old technology (for characteristics that are common to both 
the old and new technologies).  Second, succession is likely to depend on the rates at 
which old and new technology firms improve, through innovation, the quality of the 
service characteristics of their goods.  Note that, if old technology firms are more 
successful innovators than new technology firms, then the rate of improvement in direct 
utility for old technology products will be greater than for new technology products (the 
sail ship effect), increasing the probability that a succession will not occur.  As discussed 
in section 2, this possibility is excluded in the Shy and the Malerba et al. models.  Third, 
within indirect utility, differential costs (e.g. due to scale economies) will lead to 
differences in the relative prices of the alternative technology goods.  Finally, a trade off 
exists between the quality of service characteristics (direct utility) and price (indirect 
utility). 
 
 
In our model, consumer classes appear in the market in a random order, and each class 
uses its utility function to select the best combination of currently available offers6.  
The average realised utility of a consumer class depends on the distribution of offers 
made by competing firms at the time of purchase.  The average realised utility of each 
class can be assessed and compared.  This is the basis on which the distribution of the 
consumer population evolves.  Using a replicator dynamic algorithm, classes enjoying 
above average-levels of realised utility grow in size over time, while classes with 
below-average levels of realised utility decline in size.  Thus, utility plays a dual role 
in the model.  It not only embodies preferences over firms’ alternative technology 
offers, it is also the basis on which the vitality of alternative consumer classes is 
assessed.   
 
 
Initially, all firms in the model are endowed with identical levels of capacity and 
wealth.  Firms are heterogeneous with respect to the set of service characteristics that 
make up their product designs, and the consumer class that they target.  These are 
randomly generated at the outset. In each period, every firm has a current design, a 
productive capacity (setting an upper limit on output), and a non-negative inventory of 
stock carried over from the previous period.  The price of its design is determined by a 
fixed mark-up on the unit cost of production (i.e. prices do not adjust to clear the 
market).  Fixed mark-up pricing is a common feature in a number of evolutionary 
models.  Probably the best-known piece of research in this area is Hall and Hitch 
(1939).  Their study of 38 businesses found that the most common pricing procedure 
was average cost with a ‘normal’ mark-up.  The same finding has appeared in more 
recent studies in the US and UK.  More recently, more than half the 72 US firms (with 
annual revenues of $10 million  and over p.a.) interviewed by Blinder (1991) reported 
that cost-based pricing was a moderate or very important factor in explaining price 
adjustment, while 37% of respondents in the Hall et al. (1997) study of 654 UK 
companies use a cost-based pricing rule.   
 
 
                                                           
6 Available quantities are net of previous sales to other consumer classes.  
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Coordination of market supply and demand occurs through quantity adjustments in 
this model.  Firms adjust output and capacity in light of past demand.  Firms compete 
by offering a combination of service characteristics, with a consequent price, that they 
believe will be more attractive than those offered by their rivals.  In this way, a firm 
effectively offers consumers a distinct point within a multi-dimensional service 
characteristic/price space.  Product innovation is the means by which firms search this 
space.  Unit cost is the sum of an average fixed cost (a common fixed cost   which 
includes a fixed cost for innovation, divided by the firm’s level of production y) and 
an average variable cost that is a function of the good’s design (the vector of service 
characteristics offered by the design)7.  The average variable cost of a design is thus 
independent of the level of production.  The average total cost C is given by 
 
C = ( /y) + ( k  k ck(xk) )  (2) 
 
where  k are constants and the ck are monotonically increasing, convex functions of 
the kth service characteristic.  Firms set prices according to a simple mark up rule,  
 
pjt = (1+ jt)   C jt  (3) 
 
where C jt is the jth firm’s average total cost in period t and  jt is the jth firm’s mark 
up in period t.  In the current version of the model we assume there is a common and 
constant mark up so that  jt =  .   
 
 
At the beginning of each period, each firm offers a quantity (stock qjt plus production 
yjt) of goods with design xjt at a price pjt that reflects both the variable cost of 
producing the current design and an average fixed cost.   Given sales sjt and the level 
of production yjt a firm’s net revenue is  
 
 jt = pjtsjt   Cjt yjt  (4) 
 
 
This profit is added to its monetary wealth Mjt, which follows the dynamic Mjt+1 = Mjt 
+  jt.  Successful firms, with high levels of sales and production, gain a direct 
advantage from their lower average fixed costs and (in turn) lower prices, making 
their goods more attractive to consumers.  In this model, the growth of productive 
capacity is financed from initial wealth or profits, so a firm with relatively high levels 
of sales, and relatively high profits, will be able to finance a higher growth of 
capacity.  Loss making firms, by contrast, will initially use up their monetary wealth 
and, once this is exhausted, thereafter finance themselves by reducing, that is selling, 
capacity.  Once capacity becomes exhausted, the firm is bankrupt and exits the 
market.  
 
 
                                                           
7 In order to simply, this average variable cost function (mapping designs on to unit variable cost) is 
assumed to be a fixed convex separable function that is common to all firms.  The marginal cost of 
each service characteristic is positive and increasing.  The partials of the average cost function are 
positive, and the diagonals of the Hessian are positive.  
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As noted, each firm is randomly assigned a target consumer class.  Its design strategy 
is to maximise the utility function of this target class.  To simplify, we assume that 
each firm knows what this function is.  We also assume that firms cannot switch to 
other consumer classes, but multiple firms may target the same class.  Firms targeting 
the same consumer class clearly compete with each other.  In addition, competition 
between firms occurs across classes because consumers are not restricted to buying 
from firms that target that particular class, but are free to purchase the goods of any 
firm.  Having said this, the evolution of consumer classes (with relatively well 
serviced classes growing as a proportion of the total population over time while 
poorly serviced classes decline) is such that firms whose target consumer class are 
declining will lose market share over time.  
 
 
Given that all firms face the same underlying technology and cost function, and that 
firms have fixed mark-ups, the only means by which firms can improve their 
competitive position is through innovation.  Product innovation involves the creation 
and evaluation of new designs in each period.  New designs are created through a 
combination of imitation (of the service characteristics of successful rivals) and 
through the firm’s own R&D activities.  These are modelled using a modified genetic 
algorithm8 (see Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998; Windrum, 2004).  As a consequence 
of performing R&D, there is a random mutation in one or more service characteristics.  
In the evaluation process, the firm uses its knowledge of the utility function of its 
target class to determine whether the proposed design should be put into production or 
whether, alternatively, the existing design should be retained.  In other words, a firm 
will only implement the proposed design if it yields a higher utility to the target class 
than the current design.   
 
 
It is worth emphasising, once again, that a ‘design’ is a particular point in the service 
characteristic space and not a point in an engineer’s technical space.  Thus, even 
though we assume have simplified by assuming each firm knows the utility function 
of its target consumer class and that it can, in principle, identify an optimal design for 
that class9, firms do not necessarily know how to implement an optimal design.  To be 
more precise, the filtered process of imitation and mutation means firms are climbing 
hills in design space, but there is no guarantee that designs will converge on to 
optima.  Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the socially optimal combination of 
consumer class and design will emerge from the process.  The socially optimal 
consumer class can be defined to be that class with the highest utility.  If all firms 
produced optimal designs for their respective target class at the outset, and each class 
has at least one firm targeting it, then selection (here modelled using a replicator 
algorithm) would work to select the socially optimal combination of class and firm 
design over time.  However, if there are no firms that target this class, or else the 
initial set of designs are very poor (such that the class is poorly serviced and starts to 
                                                           
8 Some may suggest our algorithm is too different from a GA to be called a modified GA.  We use this 
description to clearly signal the origins of the algorithm.  The key feature of the algorithm is that cross-
over and selection are replaced by a selective transfer; one firm adopts part or all of a second firm’s 
design, but the second firm does not have to adopt the matching design, or part design, of the first.  
9 The model assumes that the whole of the service characteristic space is technically feasible, and that 
this optimal design is the one that maximises the intrinsic utility of the target consumer class.  Recall 
that improving a service characteristic increases direct utility but also increases cost and price, thereby 
reducing indirect utility.   
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decline), then the system can converge to a sub-optimal firm/consumer class 
combination.  
 
 
As implemented in this model, the replicator governs the distribution of consumers 
across classes.  Let  it = Git   G, where G is the total consumer population and Git is 
the number in class i at time t, so that  it is the proportion of the consumer population 
belonging to the ith consumer class in period t. Given the average utilities wit for the 
ith class in period t, the new distribution  it+1 is calculated as 
 it+1 =  it    (wit   Wt)    (5) 
where Wt =  k ( kt    wkt) is the average level of utility across all current classes.  
Classes with above-average utility grow as a proportion of the total distribution, while 
groups with below-average utility decline (i.e. they have a negative grow rate).  A 
fundamental feature of human development is the adoption of criteria used to shape 
decisions.  Preferences and values are not genetically determined but are the product 
of social development.  Use of this replicator dynamic on consumer classes is a 
relatively simple means of building this observation into our model.  Part of human 
adaptation is adapting preferences and values in light of individual experience and the 
experiences of our social peers. 
 
 
In the absence of shocks, this replication process almost always reduces the number of 
classes to one in the limit.  In turn, this dominant consumer group will consistently 
select out the design that yields the greatest total utility.  Further, since firms do not 
compete through variable mark-ups in this model, the process almost always leads to 
a single dominant design10 and, typically, to a monopolistic firm11. 
 
 
To investigate the possibility of succession – the breaking away from an established 
dominant firm/consumer class combination – we introduce a technological shock.  
This introduces new consumer classes, firms and designs into the model.  Picking up 
on the issues raised in section 2, a key feature of new technology designs is their 
ability to offer new characteristics that are not available with the old technology 
designs.  This is implemented in the model as an extension of the service 
characteristic space.  The other defining features of the shock are the arrival of new 
consumer classes, that put a positive weight on these new characteristics, and the 
simultaneous arrival of new firms that develop the new technology designs and target 
the new consumer classes.   
 
 
Following the creation of the new classes, firms and designs, the dynamics of the 
model run as before, i.e. the distribution of consumers across classes is governed by 
the replicator and firms grow and decline as before.  New firms and new consumer 
classes are disadvantaged by the fact old technology firms have low average fixed 
                                                           
10 Competition through design and price allows two design-price combinations to coexist.  
11 The probability of one firm perfectly replicating a second is zero and (in the long run) the replicator 
dynamic selects on any non-zero difference. 
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costs and old consumers enjoy high network utilities.  However, a new firm may start 
with a design that offers sufficiently high utility to a new consumer class.  Further, the 
new firms can innovate to improve their designs.  Success depends upon making the 
total utility of their target classes greater than average utility, inducing a virtuous 
circle of growth and eventual succession.  Still, it should be remembered that old 
technology firms are able to innovate, and thereby able to see off the challenge of the 
new entrants.  Hence, one possibility is that new firms start well but eventually wither 
away as old firms re-establish dominance through ongoing innovation.  Consequently, 
the probability of a succession occurring not only depends on the initial set of new 
firm designs and new consumer class preferences, but also by the relative innovative 
performance of new and old firms.  Too put it another way, the outcome is not 
determined by the initial ‘shock’ itself.  A succession is the outcome of a stochastic 
process of innovation, conditioned by the initial shock and by the state of the old 
firms and consumer classes at the time of the shock.   
 
 
This raises a problem.  While it is possible to identify sufficient conditions for 
succession12, a full analytical specification of the functional relationship between the 
immediate post-shock state and the probability of succession is non-trivial.  The best 
one can do is to investigate the relationship between the probability of succession and 
the conditions found at the time of a technological shock.  In the next section of the 
paper we formulate a predictive econometric model of a succession that maps the 
variables observed at the time of a shock on to the probability of a succession 
occurring.  We then present the predictive model derived from a large number of runs 
of our simulation model.  In this way we can generate robust models that meet the 
requirements of sensitivity analysis (see Windrum, 2004).  
 
 
 
4. Simulations and an econometric model of succession 
 
 
Our simulation model is dependent on a set of parameters that are assigned values at 
the beginning of each simulation run.  For example, all consumers in the model have 
the same income at the beginning of each period.  This common level of income is set 
before each simulation run.  Let θ represent the vector of these parameters; note this 
includes a specification of the shock.  Given θ, the probability of succession is, in 
principle, determined; let p(θ) be this probability.  Furthermore, we can in principle 
calculate the probability of a succession occurring, conditional on these parameter 
values and the state ω of the model at the time of the shock; let p(θ,ω) be this 
conditional probability.  If we wish to predict succession immediately after the shock, 
the best possible predictor is p(θ,ω).  Ideally we would find the analytical structure of 
p(θ,ω), but given the difficulty in identifying p(θ,ω) we adopt a different approach.  
First, we perform simulation runs at a number N of points in the parameter space.  For 
each simulation run we observe the values of the parameters, a set of “summary 
statistics” z at the time of the shock as well as observing whether or not succession 
occurs at the end of the run.   
 
                                                           
12 For example, if a new firm-consumer class pairing yields an initial total utility that exceeds the 
optimal total utility over all the old firm-consumer class pairings, then succession will occur.  
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On the basis of these observations, we next estimate a logistic model that maps a 
selected subset of the observed values (θ,z) on to a probability of succession.  The 
econometric procedures used here are those developed for forecasting business cycle 
regimes in Birchenhall et al. (1999)13.  There are two key ideas driving this 
methodology.  When constructing a predictive model it is important to identify robust 
relationship.  In choosing the econometric model, we do not aim to maximize 
statistical fit with a given sample of observations, as this can lead to distortion of the 
model by fitting to noise or sample specific variations.  Researchers using artificial 
neural networks will be familiar with this issue of over-fitting.  We need to proceed 
with some caution in the search for robust relationships.  Unless we are confident that 
we have a model that encompasses the ‘true’ model, we must treat standard errors and 
standard t-tests with caution.  The procedure adopted here, as in Birchenhall et al. 
(1999), is based on a useful result by Sin and White (1996).  If we choose our model 
so as to maximize an appropriately penalized likelihood function then, asymptotically, 
we will select the ‘best’ model even if all models are misspecified14.  The specific 
penalized likelihood function we use is the negative of the Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC), i.e. we choose that subset of parameters and summary statistics (θ,z) 
that gives the smallest SIC value.  Although this procedure has desirable asymptotic 
properties, we further test the robustness of the ensuing models by inspecting out-of-
sample predictions.   
 
 
The reader should be aware of a nuance of the procedure that makes it less than 
mechanical.  With a penalized likelihood function, every extra free parameter (i.e. free 
parameter on an included variable) incurs a penalty, and thus free variables are only 
retained if the increase in the likelihood exceeds the penalty.  These penalties tend to 
favour parsimonious models and prior restrictions on parameters can improve the 
performance of selected models.  To date, we have not attempted to specify the space 
of possible restrictions, and the choice of restrictions is based on prior judgement as 
much as statistical evidence.  For example, two summary statistics that we use in our 
prediction model are the utilities of old and new consumers.  Rather than leave them 
as independent variables, we have chosen to use their difference on the understanding 
that this is important in driving the replicator dynamic (see sections 2 and 3 above).   
 
 
While our aim is to approximate the theoretically best predictor p(θ,ω), we recognise 
that this probability will be very small in a good part of the (θ,ω)-space.  That is to 
say, for many – if not most – parameter values θ and immediate post-shock states ω, 
the probability of succession will be small.  Approximating p(θ,ω) in these regions is 
highly problematic since successions will constitute a small fraction of any sample, 
i.e. information on successions in these regions is likely to be low.  To largely 
circumvent these issues, we have restricted the analysis to a region in the parameter 
space where successions are not rare.  Hence, the estimated logit model is an 
approximation of p(θ,ω) within a restricted domain.  Some 1000 simulation runs on 
the model were conducted.  Of these, succession occurred in 456 cases.  We suggest 
that this approach is the same as that found in empirical studies.  These concentrate on 
                                                           
13 Also see Birchenhall et al. (2001) and Sensier et al. (2004) 
14 The selected model is best in the sense that the selected model will be the ‘nearest’ to the true model, 
i.e. it will have the smallest Kullback-Liebler distance from the true model.  
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cases where successions occur, and attempt to understand the factors that have 
influenced this outcome.  Clearly, one should be explicit about this methodology and 
temper one’s conclusions in the light of these restrictions, i.e. that the results are valid 
within a restricted domain.   
 
 
One detail is usefully noted before turning to the results.  Prior to estimation of the 
parameters in the logit model, the variables are standardised by subtracting the sample 
mean and dividing by the sample standard deviation.  This makes parameters 
comparable, in the sense that their size reflects the impact of a standard deviation 
change in the associated variable. 
 
 
The logit models take the form 
 
P = lf (α + β΄v) 
 
where P is the probability of succession, lƒ(r) = exp(r) / [1 + exp(r)] is the logit 
function,  α is a constant and β΄v is a linear combination of the selected variables v.  
Alternatively, we can express this relationship using the following log-odds ratio  
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Recalling that the selected variables v are standardised forms of the simulation 
parameters and the post-shock state variables, we can see that the βi associated with 
the ith variable vi measures the impact of a standard deviation increase in vi on the 
log-odds ratio.   
 
 
 
 
5. Results 
 
 
The simulation model was run 1000 times.  In the logit model reported here the initial, 
pre-selection, list of explanatory variables were 22 in number, and were a subset of 
the 36 variable parameters and post-shock state variables recorded at the end of each 
simulation.  The remaining 14 simulation variables were redundant or had 
consistently been selected out in previous logit analysis.  At the beginning of each 
run, the random number generators used in the model were initiated with new, random 
seeds and all variable parameters in the model were assigned random values.  For 
example, in each run both the number of periods T1 before and the number of periods 
T2 after the technological shock are randomly set.  The common fixed cost is set 
randomly at the start of each run.  A full list of included variable parameters and state 
variables is provided in the Appendix.   
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To clarify the structure of the selected model, we recall that a consumer’s utility 
function has three components, 
 
U(x,p,s) = d(x) + V(m – p) + e(s) 
 
where d(x) is the direct utility of design x, V(m – p) is the indirect utility dependent on 
income m and price p and e(s) is the utility arising from network externality and s is 
the market share of the good.  The principal summary statistics we use to assess the 
technological shock is the difference between the utility of old and new consumer 
classes immediately after the shock15.  This difference can be decomposed into three 
parts; namely, the difference in direct utilities, the difference in indirect utilities, and 
the difference in network utilities between old and new classes.  These differences 
measure the extent to which the consumer population as a whole is enjoying higher 
levels of utility immediately after the technological shock.  New consumer classes 
will do relatively well if the service characteristics (direct utility) they enjoy are 
relatively higher than old consumer classes and/or the cost and price (indirect utility) 
of the new goods are relatively lower than for old consumer classes.  Given that the 
new technology has been just been introduced, their network utility will, by definition, 
be lower. 
 
 
Table 1 provides information on the variables that were selected out of the original 22 
variables, together with the estimated coefficients (α,β) of the selected logit model. 
Note that, rather than using the independent time variables T1 and T2, we imposed a 
restriction by using the time ratio T2 / T1 16.  Of the 22 original variables, only 4 
variables were selected by the SIC criterion.  These are: the time ratio, the difference 
in direct utility between new and old consumer classes, the network utility associated 
with the old technology, and fixed costs.  Examining Table 1, we see that the constant 
(α) is −0.3071.  Hence, if all other variables in the model are zero (i.e. pre-
standardised variables are equal to their sample mean) then the predicted log-odds 
ratio would be −0.3071.  This corresponds to a probability of succession equal to 
0.4238 17. The coefficient on the difference in direct utility (∆DirectU) is 1.7610 and 
larger (in absolute value) than the others.  If all variables are initially at their (raw) 
sample mean, so that the predicted probability of succession is 0.4238, then an 
increase in ∆DirectU by one sample standard deviation will raise the log-odds ratio to 
−0.3071+1.7610=1.4539, or a predicted probability of succession of 0.8105.  The 
reader is invited to do similar calculations for the other three variables in Table 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
15 To be more precise we find the old consumer class with the highest within-class-average utility and 
the new consumer class with the highest within-class-average utility and subtract the old utility 
maximum from the new utility maximum.  
16 Prior experiments using independent time variables tended to generate coefficients that were 
approximately equal in size and of opposite sign, suggesting the use of the ratio.  By contrast, the 
difference in network utility and the difference in indirect utility were not found to be significant. 
17 To calculate the predicted probability given the log odds ratio, evaluate the logit function at the log-
odds ratio.  
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Coefficient Value Statistic Value 
Constant −0.3071 SIC 848.5 
∆DirectU 1.7610 Error1S 26% 
NetExt (γ) −0.6534 Error2S 17% 
Time Ratio 0.3981 Error1O 16% 
Fixed Cost −0.3309 Error2O 17% 
 
Table 1.  Logit Results 
 
 
Let us consider the signs of the selected variables.  A positive ∆DirectU implies new 
consumers give a higher assessment of the quality of the available offers than the 
assessment old consumers give to the available offers.  Thus, the new consumer 
groups will tend grow faster (or decline less quickly) as a proportion of the 
population.  Since new consumers tend to prefer the offers from new firms, new firms 
have a higher probability of gaining dominance.  The positive sign on ∆DirectU is 
consistent with this expectation, and with hypothesis 1 in section 2.   
 
 
If the network externality effect were stronger (i.e. γ were higher) than ∆DirectU, then 
we would expect the probability of succession to be low.  Further, the fact that the 
estimated coefficient on γ is negative (−0.6534) is consistent with our prior 
expectation that the network externality enjoyed by the old technology has a negative 
impact on the probability of a succession occurring.  Consequently, not only do 
consumers in the model treat intrinsic utility and network utility as substitutes (in 
accordance with Shy’s theorem), but successions are likely to occur when the gain in 
intrinsic utility ∆DirectU outweighs the network utility γ. 
 
 
If new firms have a relatively longer time to achieve succession – that is to say, the 
time ratio (T2 / T1) is higher – then we would expect the probability of succession to 
be higher as new firms have greater relative time to exploit the potential of the new 
technology.  The estimated coefficient (0.3981) is consistent with this expectation, 
and hypothesis 4 in section 2.  Finally, if fixed costs are higher, we would expect new 
technology firms to be relatively disadvantaged since they begin with a relatively low 
level of output.  The estimated coefficient of this variable (−0.3309) is consistent with 
this expectation and with hypothesis 2 in section 2. 
 
 
All in all, the signs in Table 1 are consistent with our prior expectations.  What we 
learn from these estimates is that, within the context of this particular sequence of 
simulations, changes in ‘quality’ are by far the most important predictor – the 
coefficient on ∆DirectU is almost three times larger than the next highest coefficient.  
Put simply, the best way for new technology firms to succeed is to hit the road 
running with a high quality good.  ‘Technological potential’ is, by itself, insufficient.  
A technology that prematurely enters the market may not be given time to realize its 
potential.  If firms do not immediately satisfy their target buyers, by producing and 
selling a competitive quality product, the chance of succession is greatly reduced.  
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This is further confirmed by Table 2.  From Table 2 we see that, of the 456 occasions 
in which a succession occurred, there was a positive difference between the utility 
offered by the new designs over the old designs in 306 cases. 
 
 
Succession Positive Utility 
Difference  
Negative Utility 
Difference 
Sum 
Yes 306 150 456 
No 103 441 544 
Sum 409 591 1000 
 
Table 2.  Successions and Utility Differences 
 
 
Examination of Table 2 highlights another interesting finding.  An initial positive 
difference between the direct utility of new over old technology designs does not 
guarantee a succession will occur.  This is because, as noted previously, old 
technology firms can respond to new entrants by improving the quality of their own 
designs (the sail ship effect).  If old technology firms innovate more successfully, i.e. 
increase the utility of their target consumer classes faster than new technology firms, 
then they will see off the challenge posed by the new entrants.  Equally, it is to be 
noted new technology designs may succeed even if they start with a lower initial 
utility.  The reason for this is the same: subsequent innovation by the new technology 
firms, if sufficiently effective and timely, can offset an initial disadvantage.  
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that Table 2 reinforces the proposition that the 
probability of succession is significantly enhanced when new technology firms enter 
the market with relatively good quality/price designs.  This supports hypothesis 3 in 
section 2.  
 
 
Let us next consider the right-hand side of Table 1.  While the Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC) value provides little information in itself, the error counts are of 
interest.  Given the estimated logit model, one can calculate the value of the logit 
function for any observation, and interpret this value as the predicted probability of 
succession.  If this probability is greater than 0.5 we can predict succession will occur.  
If it is less than 0.5, we predict there will be no succession.  If we observe a 
succession but the model predicts no succession, then we have a type 1 error.  
Alternatively, if we observe no succession but the model predicts succession, we have 
a type 2 error.  To test the robustness of our selected model we divided the 1000 
simulations into two parts.  The first 900 simulations were used to select variables and 
estimate the logit model.  The remaining 100 observations were used to test for out-
of-sample predictive errors.  Error1S is the percentage (26%) of in-sample 
successions the model failed to predict (% of in-sample Type 1 errors), while Error2S 
is the percentage (17%) of in-sample non-successions the model failed to predict (% 
of in-sample Type 2 errors).  Error1O (16%) and Error2O (17%) are the 
corresponding %-errors for out-of-sample observations.  We suggest the in-sample 
error count is respectable in that no naïve model would out perform this model.  
Furthermore, the out-of-sample error count is consistent with a claim that the model is 
robust.  Indeed, the out-of-sample performance is better than the in-sample 
performance.   
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6. Conclusions 
 
 
The paper contributes to our understanding of key issues in technological successions.  
In the previous section we focused on the identification of factors that assist in predicting 
a succession.  Specifically, we modelled the probability of a succession given the state of 
the market immediately following a technological shock.  Given that the underlying 
process of innovation –improving the quality/price characteristics a set of old and new 
technologies – continues after the technological shock has occurred, the best predictor 
of a post-shock succession occurred is a probability.  Our focus was thus directed to 
identifying those factors which influence the probability of succession.  Drawing on 
existing theoretical analysis and historical studies of technological succession, four 
hypotheses on the process of succession were identified and a rich computational 
simulation model of succession was used as the basis of an econometric model to 
investigate those hypotheses.   
 
 
The simulation model presented in the paper is able to address the complex 
phenomenon of quality and to break down utility into two components: direct utility 
gained through consuming service characteristics of a particular quality, and indirect 
utility associated with the price paid for a particular product.  This enables us to 
investigate questions that could not be addressed in earlier models by Shy and 
Malerba et al.  With regards to the first of our hypotheses, the findings support the 
proposition that succession depends on there being a positive differential between the 
direct utility of consuming new technology goods and the direct utility of consuming old 
technology goods.  In our model, ceteris paribus, successions are more likely to occur 
when the gain in direct utility from the new technology is high.  For this to happen, 
consumers must treat intrinsic utility and network utility as substitutes (in accordance 
with Shy’s theorem).  Under these conditions a high intrinsic utility can substitute for 
low network utility and a technology succession can occur.   
 
 
Exploring this finding in greater detail, the quality differential between the initial set 
of new technology designs and the existing old technology designs is far the most 
important predictor for a technological succession, with the coefficient on ∆DirectU 
being almost three times larger than the next highest coefficient.  This indicates that 
the most important factor in determining the probability of succession is the relative 
quality of new designs at the point of entry: the greater the relative direct utility of initial 
new designs, the higher the probability of succession.  In the presence of network 
externalities and returns to scale in production, the initial set of new technology 
products must offer service characteristics that closely meet the preferences of (one or 
more) new consumer classes.  If this is not the case, then production levels will be 
insufficient for increasing returns in production to arise, and revenues will be 
insufficient to fund innovation and, hence, build market share. 
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This highlights an important difference between the ‘innovation phase’ and ‘diffusion 
phase’ of the technology life cycle.  A technology may be able to survive in the 
innovation phase – even if it is initially inferior in many respects to the old technology 
–  provided it shows sufficient ‘promise’ or ‘potential’ to a key group of supporters.  
But in the diffusion phase (modelled here) new technology goods must be able to 
directly compete on quality and price with old technology goods.  Consumers, as in 
our model, are not interested in a technology’s potential in this phase of the life cycle.  
Hence, while the initial set of product offerings may not be fully fledged swans, it is 
important they are, at the very least, attractive ducklings.  In order to offset the 
network utility enjoyed by the established technology (the second most important 
predictor for a technological succession),  
 
 
A good initial product design may be insufficient to ensure a succession occurs, 
however.  The findings indicate 3 factors which may prevent a succession, even 
though the direct utility effect of the initial new designs outweighs the network utility 
effect of the old technology.  The first of these factors is the relative post-shock 
innovation performance of the old and new technology firms.  A strong ‘sailing ship 
effect’ was identified in our findings.  The entrance of new, competing firms stimulates 
old technology firms to innovate in order to improve the quality of their goods and, 
thereby, to see of the challenge posed by the new entrants.  Consequently, the 
probability of a succession depends on the relative rates at which new and old 
technology firms successfully innovate.  Importantly, this possibility was precluded in 
earlier models of Shy and Malerba et al. 
 
 
Turning to our remaining hypotheses, we have identified two further variables which 
affect the probability of a succession: fixed costs and time.  As with the relative 
innovation performance of new and old firms, these help explain why a succession 
can fail to occur, even when the direct utility effect of the new technology outweighs 
the network utility effect of the old technology.   Firstly, with regards to fixed costs, 
we note that the complex interplay between quality, cost and price is another issue that 
is not open to investigation in either the Shy or the Malerba et al. model.  In our 
model, a  trade-off exists between quality (direct utility of characteristics) and price 
(indirect utility) in consumers’ utility functions.  We find that new (higher quality) 
technology products will not displace an old (lower quality) technology if there is a 
significant price differential.  The assumption of mark-up pricing in our model means 
prices reflect average costs.  These are partly determined by quality (higher quality 
goods cost more to produce) and partly by fixed costs of production, and the costs of 
conducting incremental innovation.   
 
 
Increasing returns to scale, as measured by fixed costs, are found to play an important 
role in predicting a succession.  In the simulations, a fixed cost component is 
randomly initialised and is the same for all firms (new and old).  Given that unit cost 
is the sum of an average fixed cost and an average variable cost, which is a function 
of the good’s design (the vector of service characteristics offered by the design), the 
probability of a succession occurring is, ceteris paribus, negatively related to fixed 
cost.  This is because old technology firms are able to build their market share, 
increase output and, hence, reduce average fixed costs prior to the new firms entering 
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the market.  This is an important finding in the paper, and one that is supported by a 
significant body empirical research which indicates that high start-up costs are an 
important factor deterring new market entrants (cf. Klepper, 1996).  Consequently, 
there are both demand-side network externalities and supply-side production 
externalities that inhibit successions occurring in our model. 
 
 
Time is the remaining variable identified as affecting the probability of a succession 
in this set of simulations.  Specifically, it is found that a succession is more likely to 
occur (i) the shorter the time for the old technology firms to innovate and develop 
designs that closely match the preferences of their target consumers, and (ii) the 
longer that new firms are given to innovate and turn their attractive ducklings into 
fully fledged swans.  As a final observation, drawing our conclusions to a close, we 
observe the extent to which our co-evolutionary model highlights the fundamental 
structural impact of a technological succession, when it occurs, on an economic 
system.  A succession is more than the displacement of old technology products with 
new technology products.  It also involves the displacement of existing consumer 
classes and preferences with new consumer classes with different preference sets, the 
displacement of established market firms by new market firms, and established 
structures of production by new production structures.  The Schumpeterian ‘gales of 
create destruction’ are widespread in reach and deep in their impact. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Parameters of the simulation model and post-shock state variables. 
 
In 
Logit 
Symbol Description Value Range 
 T1 Number of periods before technological 
shock 
RandIndex[100,200] 
 T2 Number of periods after shock RandIndex [100,600] 
Yes T-ratio T1 / T2   
 N Number of characteristics in full (new) 
design space 
8 
Yes N1 Number of characteristics shared by old and 
new 
RandIndex [4,7] 
Yes r Average proportional reduction in costs for 
new firms 
Uniform[0,0.5] 
Yes xmax Maximum value of all xi before T1 Uniform[0.3,1.0] 
Yes ∆DU New/Old difference in direct utility Post Shock State Var 
Yes ∆IU New/Old difference in indirect utility Post Shock State Var 
Yes ∆NU New/Old difference in network utility Post Shock State Var 
Yes γ Network externality parameter: as in e(s) = γs Uniform[0,1.5] 
Yes M Monetary budget of consumers Uniform[10,50] 
 G Total population of consumers 60 
  Number of consumer groups 8 
Yes Sc Old consumer groups with a population share 
less than this value are replaced by new 
consumer groups after shock. 
Uniform[0.1,0.2] 
Yes Biasc Probability that utility coefficient on xi is 
non-zero 
Uniform[0.3,0.8] 
Yes Biaso Probability that xi in initial design is non-zero Uniform[0.3,0.8] 
Yes K0 Initial capital = capacity for all firms  Uniform[5,10] 
Yes W0 Initial monetary wealth of all firms Uniform[10,20] 
Yes  Fc Partial adjustment factor to temper 
adjustment of capacity to target 
Uniform[0.25,0.5] 
Yes  Fp Partial adjustment factor to temper 
adjustment of production target to recorded 
excess demand 
Uniform[0.1,0.2] 
Yes  Fs Partial adjustment factor to temper 
adjustment of target market share to actual 
share 
Uniform[0.1,0.2] 
Yes Sf Old firms with a capacity share less than this 
value are replaced by new firms after shock. 
Uniform[0.1,0.2] 
Yes 
  Probability of design mutation Uniform[0.2,0.4] 
Yes 
  Mutation size factor Uniform[0.05,0.1] 
Yes 
 X Probability of selective transfer  Uniform[0.5,1] 
Yes 
  Fixed cost of production in each time period Uniform[1.0,3.0] 
 
Uniform [a,b] indicates the parameter is uniformly distributed across the interval 
[a,b], while RandIndex [M,N] indicates the parameter is a random integer uniformly 
distributed across the range from M to N. 
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